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PRIVATE LAW
TORTS
David W. Robertson*
[Note: Only the cases decided by the Supreme Court during this
period have been considered.]
Probably nobody would contend that liability for a cow killed
by a train should be predicated upon the violation of a statute
which forbade operating trains on Sunday. The explanation
which would usually be given for non-recovery in this situation
would probably be that the breach of the statute was not the
proximate cause of the harm. According to Professor Prosser,
in such an explanation "there is an obvious fallacy. In all such
cases the act of the defendant itself has caused the damage:
if a train run on Sunday strikes a cow, it cannot be said that
the act of running the train did not have a causal connection,
and a very direct and important one, with the death of the cow." 1
A better explanation would be that the event which occurred
was not among the risks against which the statute was designed
to protect. Similarly, if a railroad safety regulation imposes
a speed limit of 25 miles per hour in the town of Vinton, will
liability for a collision accident be predicated upon the breach
of that regulation in a situation where it appears that the colli-
sion could not have been avoided even had the train been pro-
ceeding at a speed within the regulation? That was the question
at issue in Perkins v. Texas & New Orleans R.R.2 The Supreme
Court held that the defendant was not liable in that situation,
stating that as the collision would have been unavoidable even
had the train been operating at a speed within the regulation,
the violation of the regulation was not the cause-in-fact of the
accident. Professor Green has recently stated the view that
the proper ambit of the cause-in-fact issue never goes beyond
inquiring into whether a causal relation exists between the
totality of defendant's conduct and the harm in question; he
feels that the issue can be settled affirmatively if it can be said
that the defendant "had anything to do with" the harm which
occurred. 3 Under his view, the approach taken in the Perkins
case would be subject to criticism as having attempted to deter-
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1. PROSSER, TORTS 155 (2d ed. 1955).
2. 243 La. 829, 147 So. 2d 646 (1962).
3. See Green, The Cauaal Relation Imsee In Negligence Law, 60 MIcH. L.
REv. 543 (1962).
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mine whether any causal relation existed between the harm and
that aspect of defendant's conduct which is allegedly negligent
or unlawful. The totality of defendant's conduct- operating a
railroad train at a speed of 37 miles per hour - did cause plain-
tiff's harm, but the negligent aspect of defendant's conduct -
the unwarranted additional 12 miles per hour - did not. Viewed
in this light, the reason why recovery would be denied in a case
like Perkins would be that the regulation in question was not
designed to protect against the risk of a collision which would
have been unavoidable under conditions which would have
amounted to compliance with the regulation.
Another instructive causation problem was at issue in
Naquin v. Marquette Cas. Co.4 In that case the trial court and
the court of appeal concluded that plaintiff had not proved with
sufficient certainty that escaping natural gas - which he could
without difficulty attribute to the fault of defendant's insured,
the town of Breaux Bridge - had caused the fire and explosion
which destroyed his apartment. The Supreme Court reversed,
concluding that the requirement of proof of causation apparently
adopted in the lower courts "raises an insurmountable barrier
to the proof of causation in a civil action." 5 After pointing out
that proving causation by circumstantial evidence, while re-
quiring the negation of other reasonable hypotheses, does not
require negating all other possible causes, the court concluded
that the alternative hypothesis put forward by defendant was
the "mere suggestion of a remote possibility."6
In Wise v. Prescott,7 the Supreme Court was confronted with
conflicting tesitmony as to the circumstances under which a
release was obtained from plaintiff, a seventy-year-old woman,
within twenty-four hours of the accident. According to her
testimony, the adjuster did not reveal himself as an employee
of the insurer nor did she have any inkling of what she was
signing. The adjuster's testimony was contradictory in practi-
cally every particular. The court, noting that the legislatures
of at least seven states have passed measures affecting the
validity of such "rush releases," affirmed a jury finding that
plaintiff executed the release through error. The court stated:
"Up to this time the Legislature of our state has not enacted
4. 244 La. 569, 153 So. 2d 395 (1963).
5. Id. at 574, 153 So. 2d at 396.
6. Id. at 578, 153 So. 2d at 398.
7. 244 La. 157, 151 So. 2d 356 (1963).
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any law to protect persons suffering personal injuries from the
possibility of error inherent to quick releases, compromises, or
settlements, and this court would not be justified in declaring
a 'rush release' invalid simply because it was obtained within a
very short time of the accident. In such cases, however, we
feel that we are justified in recognizing that high potential for
error in our consideration of all the facts and circumstances
connected with the execution of this type of release."'8
SECURITY DEVICES
Joseph Dainow*
PLEDGE
In Montaldo Ins. Co. v. Cullotta,' a judgment creditor brought
a garnishment proceeding against a bank in which the judgment
debtor had some money on deposit. However, to secure a loan,
the depositor had executed a written pledge of his accounts to
the bank. This was held to be a good pledge for which delivery
was not necessary since the pledgee bank already had posses-
sion2 and there was no waiver of its rights by permitting ac-
tivity of the checking account and withdrawals from the savings
account. Thus, even though the plaintiff's garnishment was
maintained, his rights were subject and subordinate to the
bank's pledge which more than covered the funds in the ac-
counts.
PRIVILEGES
The facts in the case of Pecora v. Jamess were pregnant with
several problems which remained stillborn. James purchased a
trailer under a conditional sale contract executed and duly re-
corded in Mississippi. With a large balance still unpaid, he
brought the trailer to Louisiana and parked it on the plaintiff's
premises under a monthly rental agreement. When he disap-
peared leaving the rent unpaid, the plaintiff had the trailer
seized under a writ of sequestration claiming a lessor's privilege.
8. Id. at 174, 151 So. 2d at 362.
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1. 153 So. 2d 899 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
2. LA. CivIL CODE art. 3152 (1870).
3. 150 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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